
By: Bjørnar K. Slettvåg
China’s population over 60 years of age is set to surpass 200 million next year, and this group has a higher savings rate than their peers almost anywhere else in the world. For my master thesis, and as part of the larger KOV research project on Chinese savings, I am currently in China conducting a survey with the objective of gaining more insights into the savings motivation and financial priorities of the Chinese elderly. Following the successful completion of pilot interviews in early April, full scale interviewing of 600 respondents is now initiated in urban and rural Shanghai and Chengdu. Below follow a brief introduction of the project, and some preliminary findings from the pilot interviews.
China’s export-led economic development has been characterized by very high levels of investments, accompanied by even higher national savings. There are growing concerns for the sustainability of this growth model, and the need to rebalance the Chinese economy is advocated not only by its trading partners, but also increasingly within China itself.
The household savings, which account for about one third of total savings in China, are a central variable in this transition towards stronger domestic demand. The household savings rate is much higher than in most other countries, and a particular feature for China is that savings remain high and increasing also for elderly households. This contradicts predictions of the life-cycle hypothesis, where one would expect savings rates to decrease prior to retirement, and turn negative as de-saving occurs throughout elderly life.
It is often argued that the Chinese elderly save more than they need to because of uncertainty about future income and health shocks, primarily due to fragmented pension systems and large out-of-pocket health care expenses. However, such precautionary motives would have to rely on high parameters of risk aversion in order to explain the observed savings behavior . We want to gain further insights into these issues by gathering data on both savings motives and expected income, including the availability, adoption and benefits of pension schemes and health insurance.
In addition, we propose that theories of “selfish” precautionary saving need to be complemented with intentional bequest and transfer motives in order to provide a better understanding of the household savings pattern in China. The survey is therefore especially aimed at uncovering intergenerational interaction such as monetary risk sharing, service provision, asset transfers and co-residence.
We account for the large economic and social inequalities in China, both between urban and rural, and coastal and inland areas, by carrying out the survey in four different locations: urban and rural Shanghai (tier 1 city, coastal), and urban and rural Chengdu (tier 2 city, inland).
Preliminary results from the pilot interviews indicate that adoption and benefits of pension schemes are far from government targets, especially in rural areas. Consistently, nearly half of the respondents regard transfers from children as their main source of post-retirement income. At the same time, roughly one third of the elderly state that their main savings motive is inter-vivo transfers to children, and we identify substantial downward transfers from the old generation related to their adult children’s housing purchase, wedding and education. The pilot also confirms a high level of co-residence with adult children in urban areas. Finally, the preliminary data suggest that in spite of pronounced government efforts to increase health insurance coverage, a substantial number of elderly people do neither have any health insurance, nor much knowledge about the availability of such systems.
In sum, the data from the pilot interviews support the hypothesis of strategic intergenerational interactions, and the existence of transfer and bequest motives in the savings behaviour of China’s elderly. If confirmed in the full-scale survey, such findings may imply slow adoption or unanticipated crowding out effects of governmental social programs. In that case, reforms aimed at reducing motivation for precautionary saving and boosting consumption might prove less effective than in a situation without filial piety and the institutionalized interactions of the trusted family.
1. For example «Chamon, M., K. Liu, and E. Prasad (2011), Income Uncertainty and Household Savings in China» rely on high risk aversion parameters in order to match the mean savings rate for household heads with a standard buffer-stock life cycle model of consumption.